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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16200 
GLORIA DANKER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NA'l'URE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by jnformation with the 
crime of tampering with a witness in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-508, 1953 as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried in the Fourth District Court 
in Uintah County before a jury on October 11, 1978, and 
was found guilty as charged. On November 4, 1978, the 
Honorable George E. Balliff sentenced appellant to a term 
in the Utah Stute Prison of 0 to S years and ordered the 
appellant to pay a fine of $250.00. Execution of the sentence 
was suspended on,l aprellant was placed on probation for a period 
oi t\·.'o yc.u s. 
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R~LIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the lower 
court's action in the disposition of this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Early in the morning of August 6, 1978, the 
appellant called the Vernal City Police and asked them to co~ 
to her home in Vernal (T. at 57). Two patrol cars responded. 
When the officers arrived, they found appellant and a Mr. 
Kenneth D'Anza yelling at each other on the front porch 
(T. at 171. When D'Anza went to leave, appellant directed 
the officers to stop him. The officers questioned why and 
appellant replied, "I have caught him in bed with my 
daughter. I believe he has had sex with my daughter." 
(T. at 18). The officers immediately arrested Mr. D'Anza 
and took appellant and her daughter to a hospital to be 
examined (T. at 19). 
On the way to the hospital, the appellant 
instructed her daughter to, "Tell the officer what 
happened. Be truthful about what happened." The child 
stated that Nr. D'Anza had "stuck: his pee-pee in her bum 
hole, and his finger in her pee-pee." (T. at 19). 
Detective Robert Downard of the Vernal City 
Police Depurtment mel app,•llil.nt at the hospital and 
began an investigation of th~ incirlcnt. He stated: 
- 7-
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T. 'at 24. 
I told her (appellant) that Mr. 
D'Anza would be charged with this; 
that the investigation was continuing, 
and that I would be to her residence 
sometime on Monday to review the crime 
scene. 
The following Monday, August 7th, Detective Downard visited 
appellant's house and told her that a forcible sodomy 
investigation was in progress and that her daughter was an 
integral part of the case. He stated on cross-examination: 
I believe she even asked me if 
her daughter would have to testify and 
I indicated yes. 
Later that afternoon, appellant took her children 
to the Vernal Family Health Center for an additional 
examination (T. at 34). While she was there, she was 
informed that her daughter Rayna (the victim in the sodomy 
investigation) was to be placed in temporary shelter care by 
the Division of Family Services (T.at 35). Appellant then 
indicated to the police that they no longer had a case; 
"that she had instructed her daughter not to testify against 
Kenneth D'Anza; and that she had also told her never to 
talk to any more police officers about this case." 
(T. at 35). Officer John Parker of the Vernal City Police 
DepJrlment drove appellant and her children from the 
Health Center to the Division of Family Services (T. at 
3 'i- 3 G) lie testified that appellan l: continued to re-affirm 
-3-
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the fact that she had told her daughter not to talk or 
cooperate with the police. She also told her daughter, 
who was sitting on her lap, not to talk to the police 
and to forget everything she knew (T. at 36). Officer 
Darrell Lance was also in the car and corroborated Officer 
Parker's testimony (T. at 44). As the officers left the 
Division of Family Services, appellant yelled, "There goes 
your case, suckers. You haven't got a case, suckers." (T. 
at 36, 44, and 64). 
Appellant testified as to what she had told 
her daughter: 
I said, "If they ask you any 
questions about Ken (D'Anza), don't 
tell them. Tell them you forgot." I 
say_s, "When Mr. Downard came," I says, 
"Nhen they came they said that you 
could stay with me, and now they are 
taking you away from me." So I says 
u f I I they tell you that you can come 
back home to mommy, if you tell them 
that Ken did all of this stuff d~n't believe them, because th~y are 
l~ers .. Don't tell them nothing unless 
mommy ~s there." 
(T. at 64). 
She also testified: 
~ did say, "You suckers, you 
blew ~t. You don't have a case." 
(T. at 64). 
-4-
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At the request of appellant's trial counsel, the 
court instructed the jury, inter alia, that: 
. . the defendant is charged 
with the specific offense of witness 
tampering, as set forth in these 
instructions, and that you should 
not allow yourselves to be prejudiced 
against her because of any relationship 
she may have had with Mr. D'Anza or 
by the fact that he has been charged 
with an offense. 
(Jury Instruction No. 13, R. at 26 and T.at 80). 
After deliberation, the jury found appellant 
guilty, as charged, of having tampered with a witness in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508, 1953 as amended. 
After a pre-sentence investigation was completed, the 
court sentenced appellant to a $250.00 fine and a suspended 
term of 0 to 5 years in the Utah State Prison with two 
years probation (R. at 33,34). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
IT WAS NECESSARY AND PROPER IN THIS 
CASE FOR THE STATE TO SHOW THE 
NATURE OF THE INVESTIGATION WITH 
lmiCH APPELLAJ.'JT INTERFERED. 
In State v. Renzo, 21 U.2d 205, 443 P.2d 392 
(1968), this court noted that: 
. discretion on the part of 
a trial judge to admit or reject 
evidence should not be interfered 
with by an ap~ellate court unless 
manifest error is shown. 
21 U.2d 0t 215. 
-5-
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In that case, particularly gruesome pictures of a 
sexual molestation/murder victim had been admitted to 
establish the depravity element for voluntary manslaughter. 
The verdict was affirmed. 
Admission of color slides as evidence in a 
murder case was also considered in State v. Poe, 21 U.2d 113, 
441 P.2d 512 (1968). '!'his Court stated that; 
Initially, it is within the 
sound discretion of the trial 
court to determine whether the 
inflanunatory nature of such slide is 
outweighed by their probative 
value with respect to fact in issue. 
If the latter they may be admitted 
eventhough gruesome. In the instant 
case they had no probative value. 
All the material facts which could 
con~civJ~ly have been adduced from 
a viewinc.. of the slides had been 
establi!ihed by uncontradicted lax 
and medical testimony. The only 
purpose was to inflame' and arouse 
the jury. 
(21 U.2d at 117) [emphasis added] . 
Reading ~and Poe together, it is clear that evidence 
which is gruesome or particularly prejudicial may be admitted 
when it is probative with respect to a fact in issue and 
that f~ct is not shown by other, less gruesome evidence. 
The conviction in Poe was reversed, partly because the 
only purpose for the evidence complained of was "to inflame 
and arouse the jury." (Id. at 117). 0ther less gruesome 
photos ,demonstrated the very fact which the complained of 
photos showed. 
-6-
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In the instant case, appellant was charged with 
a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508, 1953 as ~nded; 
A person is guilty of a felony 
of the third degree if: 
(1) Believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is 
pending or about to be instituted, 
he attempts to influence or other-
wise cause a person to: 
(a) Testify or 
inform falsely: or 
(b) Withhold any 
testimony, information, 
document, or thing: 
It was necessary for the state to show that 
appellant knew or believed that an official investigation was 
pending and also that instructing her daughter to not 
testify would interfere. The information before the 
jury in the instant case would have been nonsensical if the 
prosecution had omitted any reference to the nature of the 
official investigation concerning appellant's daughter. In 
order to make clear that appellant was attempting to 
interfere with that investigation by telling her young 
daughter to not talk to the police, the prosecution had to 
show that the other charge centered upon the little girl's 
testimony and that appellant knew it. Although the 
potential for arousing passion and feelings of disgust is 
great where sexual abuse of small children is involved, these 
cases are also the ones wherein a prosecutor's case must 
-7-
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often rely most heavily upon the testimony of young 
children. In order to show that appellant attempted to 
interfere with the investigation by withholding her 
daughter's testimony, the state had to show the nature 
of the investigation. The purpose of the evidence was not 
solely to arouse and inflame the jury as in Poe, supra, but 
was, instead necessary to the demonstration of a material 
fact, as in Renzo, supra. 
Appellant specifically complained of the 
test~ony of one of the police officers wherein he noted what 
the little girl had told him concerning the sexual abuse 
(Appellant's brief at p. 9, T. at 19). This statement of the 
child, made in her mother's presence and at her mother's 
urging, showed the fact tha~ the mother clearly knew that 
an investigation for abuse of her daughter was likely and 
that her daughter's testimony would go directly to 
establishing a case against Mr. D'Anza. Although other 
evidence in this case may have shown that appellant knew of 
the forcible sodoQy charge, this evidence alone clearly 
showed that appellant understood what her daughter's 
testimony would be and how important it was to the 
state's case. 
The additional cases cited by appellant can be 
distinguished and arc not determinativ~ of this matter. 
-8-
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In Oxedine v. State, Okl. 335 P.2d 940 (~,:Mn~~ 
as in Poe, supra, gruesome photographs were 
they had no probative value but served only to inflame 
arouse the jury. In this case, the complained of evideDpe 
formed an essential part of the state's case and could not baYe 
been omitted. 
State v. Amundson, 37 Wash. 2d. 356, 223 P.2d 
1067 (1950), was an indecent assault case. In that case, 
the evidence complained of was a statement by a witness 
connecting the defendant with other, unrelated sex crimes 
without showing that the defendant had been convicted for 
those crimes. In the instant case, the evidence is of a 
substantially different nature. It did not indicate 
that appellant may have committed other crimes similar to, 
but unconnected with the instant charge. In this case, the 
evidence shed light upon the nature of this charge. It 
explained the circumstances surrounding the very crime with 
which appellant was charged. In Amundson, the court noted: 
To stress this alleged act of 
misconduct (which had no logical 
connection with the crime charged) 
constituted prejudicial error and 
entitled appellant to a new trial. 
Id. at 1069, (paranthetical in original). 
In the instant case, the evidence was logically and 
inseparably connected with the state's case. Appellant's 
atturn0y states that "defendant Danker was painted as a 
-9-
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person who defended a man accused of abusing her own 
daughter." (Appellant's brief at pp. 8-9). While he may 
be correct, the effect of appellant's crime in this case was 
to do just that. It was impossible for the state to prove 
its case and hide that fact from the jury. Prejudicial 
evidence should be excluded when it has nothing to do with 
the charge at hand. But when, as in this case, the 
evidence goes to the very charge before the jury and 
explains the circumstances and crime to be considered by the 
jury it should n9t be excluded. Respondent urges this 
Court to affirm the judgment and conviction of the lower 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
When other evidence is available or has been 
presented to demonstrate the same facts soughL to be 
shown by evidence which is highly prejudicial and in-
flammatory by nature, the prejudicial evidence should not 
be admitted. In such a case, the only purpose for the 
evidence would be to arouse and impassion the jury. However, 
in this case, the co~plained of evidence was a necessary and 
integral part of the state's case. Without it, the evidence 
as a whole would have been unclear. The jury could not 
have understood the charqe. Moreover, the prejudicial aspect 
-10-
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stemmed not so much from the evidence itself as from 
what it demonstrated about the nature of this case. There 
was no error, the verdict and sentence should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
-11-
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